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VOTING AS A POSITIVE RIGHT: A 
REPLY TO FLANDERS 
JOSEPH FISHKIN* 
 
Chad Flanders’ thoughtful article1 demonstrates that the 
Murkowski litigation raised questions with surprisingly fundamental 
implications for election law. This brief response addresses just one of 
those questions. The question, which at first blush sounds awfully 
narrow and wonkish, is this: Can a state allow write-in votes, but 
discourage them by making them difficult to cast?2 I will argue that the 
answer is no—for reasons that highlight two fundamental, but 
underappreciated, aspects of election law. 
I. 
The Supreme Court has settled the question of whether states must 
allow write-in candidacies and votes at all: They need not. In Burdick v. 
Takushi,3 the Court upheld a Hawaiian statutory scheme that prohibited 
write-in votes entirely.4 The scheme did offer minor party and 
independent candidates what the Court deemed “easy access to the 
ballot.”5 In the Court’s view, “the function of the election process” itself 
is to narrow the list of candidates and find a winner; the state’s interest 
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 1. Chad Flanders, How do you spell M-U-R-K-O-W-S-K-I? Part I: The Question 
of Assistance to the Voter, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 21–25; see id. at 3–4 (“[T]o what extent can a state legitimately 
disadvantage a write-in candidate who has won neither party’s primary? Can a 
state, for reasons of either principle or expediency, make it harder for voters to 
write-in the names of candidates?”). 
 3. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 4. Id. at 441. 
 5. Id. at 436. Specifically, Hawaii allowed independent candidates to run in 
a “nonpartisan primary” and proceed to the general election if they received ten 
percent of the primary votes, or a number sufficient to nominate a party 
candidate. Id. Alternatively, new parties, including those organized around one 
candidate, could secure a spot on the general election ballot through a petition 
signed by one percent of the state’s registered voters. Id. at 435.  Of course, this is 
hardly “easy” in comparison to Alaska’s standards for write-in candidates, who 
need only file a letter of intent at least five days before the election. See ALASKA 
STAT. § 15.25.105 (2010). 
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in “winnowing out candidates” and “avoiding divisive sore-loser 
candidacies” was sufficiently weighty to justify an outright prohibition 
of write-in candidacies and votes.6 
Since a state may choose either to allow or to prohibit write-in 
votes, common sense might suggest that an in-between position of 
“permit but discourage” is equally constitutional: allow write-in votes, 
but discourage them by making them a bit more difficult to cast. The 
Alaska Republican Party argued in the Murkowski litigation that not 
only could a state do this, Alaska was doing it, by enacting stringent rules 
that write-in votes must be correctly spelled.7 The argument was that 
such rules make write-in votes more difficult to cast and thereby 
function as part of a larger scheme aimed at discouraging write-ins and 
encouraging voters instead to choose one of the candidates on the 
ballot.8 
The claim that a state can “permit but discourage” is appealing on 
its face. After all, reasons sufficient to justify an outright ban on 
something are almost always also sufficient to justify regulations short 
of an outright ban. Supposing that the reasons the Court laid out in 
Burdick justify a regime of no write-ins at all, one would think those 
same reasons could also justify more modest measures aimed at pushing 
voters to “focus” on the listed candidates. 9 
What this straightforward argument misses is that states are doing 
more than one thing when they regulate elections. Election law defines 
the structure of democratic competition: the rules that determine the 
choices voters face and the terms on which voters make those choices. 
When a state draws a new map of legislative districts, enacts a sore loser 
law, or decides whether and on what terms to allow write-in 
candidacies, it is defining the terms of democratic competition. The 
players here are candidates and parties. The structural rules affect which 
of those players will win elections. Thus, such rules are typically the 
 
 6. Id. at 438–40. The Court also cited an interest in preventing “party 
raiding.” Id. at 439. Scholars have roundly criticized these interests. See, e.g., 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups of 
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 668–674 (1998) (arguing that the real 
purpose and effect of the regulation, which the court failed to understand, was 
to entrench the power of a ruling faction within a party and prevent internal 
defection). 
 7. Flanders, supra note 1, at 24. 
 8. Id. (citing Alaska Republican Party’s Opposition to Petition for Review at 
8–10, State, Div. of Elections v. Alaska Democratic Party, No. S-14054 (Alaska 
Oct. 29, 2010)). 
 9. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439 (holding that Hawaii’s rule focuses the 
attention of voters). 
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object of intense interest, lobbying, legislation, and litigation by parties 
and candidates and their allies. 
Election law also does something else: it determines which 
individuals will be allowed to vote and which votes, once cast, will 
count. When a state adopts rules about what forms of identification are 
required to vote, or rules about which imperfectly-filled-out ballots will 
be counted, the state is doing more than simply defining the terms of the 
competition among candidates and parties. It is also making decisions 
that affect the interests of individual voters, deciding what burdens 
voters will face when they attempt to exercise their right to vote. Wholly 
apart from structural questions about the rules of the competition, and 
from questions about which faction’s ox may be gored, each individual 
voter has an interest in being able to cast a ballot and have it counted.10 
Rules that make write-in votes difficult to cast may create a trap for 
the unwary: fill out the form incorrectly, and risk being disenfranchised. 
In this way, the “permit but discourage” regime discussed above does 
something quite different from either allowing write-ins or prohibiting 
them. We miss this point if we limit our analysis exclusively to the 
structural question of how open or closed a given electoral system is to 
write-in candidacies. On that dimension, “permit but discourage” is 
indeed a middle point between “allow” and “prohibit.” But that 
question, while important, is not the only one in play. 
When a state decides either to allow or to prohibit write-ins, no one 
is disenfranchised. To be sure, voting is, to a limited extent, a form of 
expression; a write-in ban affects voters’ First Amendment interests.11 
But from the perspective of an individual voter, a write-in ban is not the 
same as being prevented from voting or having one’s vote discarded. 
The experience of walking into the voting booth and not seeing one’s 
preferred choice—or not seeing any choices that one likes—is not 
disenfranchisement. Indeed, in the age of negative advertising, it may be 
the usual experience of the typical American voter. 
Courts can see the difference between a write-in ban like the one in 
Burdick, which channels choices but disenfranchises no one, and a rule 
that actually imperils some voters’ right to cast a ballot and have it 
counted. Courts will scrutinize the latter rule more closely, for reasons 
that are rooted in a commitment to the equal citizenship of each 
 
 10. In a forthcoming article, I offer a fuller argument for making this 
distinction. Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 
IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1742642. 
 11. This was central to the interest the Court considered in Burdick. 504 U.S. 
at 430; see also Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330 
(1993). 
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individual voter.12 Heightened scrutiny is particularly appropriate here 
because this trap for the unwary is likely to have a disproportionate 
effect on some of the sorts of voters whose status as full, equal citizens 
with the right to cast a ballot may already be relatively tenuous: citizens 
who are relatively less educated, who are very elderly, who have 
disabilities that make the mechanical aspects of casting the ballot tricky, 
and so forth.13 The structural aims that were sufficient to uphold the rule 
in Burdick14  are unlikely to be strong enough to justify a rule that places 
such a burden on voters’ participation rights. Courts should, and likely 
would, conclude that a state cannot “permit but discourage” write-in 
votes in the manner suggested by the Alaska Republican Party.15 
The logic here does not depend on any claim that disfavoring 
write-in candidates relative to candidates listed on the ballot is 
constitutionally problematic. Indeed, write-in status is inherently 
disfavored. That is, the state already steers voters toward the listed 
candidates by listing them on the ballot. Furthermore, nothing is 
stopping states from channeling voters’ choices in a more decisive way 
by banning write-ins altogether. The constitutional problem arises 
because the state is discarding votes, thereby placing a burden on some 
voters’ ability to be counted as full and equal citizens. If a state required 
all voters to write down their choices and spell them correctly, on pain of 
having their votes discarded, this problem would be worse, not better. 
But now we are at the edge of a deeper and more interesting 
problem. Against what baseline does one measure a “burden”? Alaska 
had a relatively easy solution to the problem of throwing out votes 
unnecessarily: rely on an intent-of-the-voter standard rather than 
demanding that votes be spelled correctly. Still, under Alaska’s 
standard, and under any plausible standard, it is necessary to discard 
votes whose intent is genuinely unclear. These unclear votes and other 
failed votes do not appear out of the ether. They are the product of 
interactions, most of them fairly predictable, between the voter and the 
rules and technological apparatus provided by the state. For example, 
requiring voters to signal their preferred candidate’s name letter by 
letter, scrolling through the entire alphabet for each letter using an 
awkward rotary dial, is likely to result in more errors and incoherence 
 
 12. See Fishkin, supra note 10 (manuscript at 36–39). 
 13. Id. (manuscript at 51–53). 
 14. See 504 U.S. at 439–40. 
 15. In the Murkowski litigation, the Alaska Supreme Court avoided this 
issue because it rejected the Republican Party’s reading of the statute on other 
grounds. See Flanders, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
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than simply allowing voters to write a name on a piece of paper.16 
Refusing to help voters operate the machine would further compound 
the problem, as would refusing to furnish voters with information about 
how to spell candidates’ names. But if the state’s refusal to do these 
things creates a burden on the right to vote, what or how much must a 
state do to avoid creating such a burden? 
This problem arises for a simple reason. Voters need help to vote. I 
do not mean that only a few voters or certain groups of voters need help. 
State action is required if any of us are to vote at all. The state must set 
up polling places, train workers, buy machines, print ballots. The entire 
enterprise of voting requires positive action by the state. This is because 
voting is, inescapably, a positive right. 
II 
It is a truism that “the Constitution is a charter of negative rather 
than positive liberties.”17 This truism is mostly true. Although the 
distinction between positive and negative rights is not always so sharp,18 
and most negative rights entail an apparatus of state enforcement,19 our 
courts have generally read the rights language of the United States 
Constitution to speak in negative rather than positive terms, that is, to 
speak in terms of what the state may not do to us.20 
It is possible to try to frame the right to vote that way. Our law 
once did so. Before the emergence of the modern, universal right of 
 
 16. This ill-conceived method gained national prominence when voters in 
Tom DeLay’s former district found themselves using it to tap out the name of 
the Republican candidate to succeed him on a Hart InterCivic machine. See 
Byron York, In Texas, S-H-E-L-L-E-Y S-E-K-U-L-A G-I-B-B-S Has a Real Chance to 
Win, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Nov. 3, 2006) http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
articles/ 219154/texas-s-h-e-l-l-e-y-s-e-k-u-l-g-i-b-b-s-has-real-chance-win/ 
byron-york (describing the voting method). 
 17. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.). 
 18. For example, the right not to be deprived of liberty without due process 
of law sounds self-evidently negative, but it translates into a positive right to 
adequate legal representation when charged with a crime. See Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 19. See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS (1999) 
(arguing that this fact renders problematic the distinction between negative and 
positive rights). 
 20. Judge Posner’s formulation is typical: “The men who wrote the Bill of 
Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people 
but that it might do too much to them.” Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1203; see Frank B. 
Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001). 
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citizens to vote,21 a succession of constitutional amendments and court 
decisions constructed a series of narrower, more negatively phrased 
constitutional rights not to be denied the right to vote on specific 
grounds such as race,22 sex,23 failure to pay a poll tax,24 age,25 lack of 
ownership of property,26 and so on. These specific protections 
proliferated at an accelerating pace in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
leading finally to the Court’s recognition of a positive right to vote for 
each adult citizen untethered from these negative rights against specific 
forms of vote denial.27 
But in truth, voting was a positive right (for those who had it) from 
the very start. Without positive state action, there is no voting. One way 
to define negative rights is to ask what rights would be automatically 
fulfilled if the state did nothing—or indeed, if the state did not exist.28 
Although the limitations of this sort of thought experiment illustrate the 
conceptual difficulty of truly disentangling positive from negative 
rights, it does make clear that to the degree that any such distinction can 
 
 21. See Fishkin, supra note 10 (manuscript at 41–46). This right is not 
completely universal. Although the Court often states that voting can now be 
limited only by age, citizenship, and residency, this formulation ignores states’ 
continuing disenfranchisement of felons and ex-felons. Id. (manuscript at 49–50). 
 22. U. S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
 23. U. S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on 
account of sex.”). 
 24. U. S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States 
to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for 
electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in 
Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by 
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); Harper v. Va. Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
 25. For those at least eighteen. U. S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of 
citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age.”) 
 26. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 204 (1970); Cipriano v. 
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06 (1969). 
 27. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (“In decision after 
decision, this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected 
right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the 
jurisdiction.”); see supra note 21. The right to vote on an equal basis with other 
citizens—or more generally, to be treated as the equal of one’s fellow citizens in 
the democratic sphere—sounds in both liberty and equality, making it what 
some scholars now term a “dignity” claim. E.g., Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and 
Rank, 48 EUR. J. SOC. 201 (2007); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011); see Fishkin, supra note 10 (manuscript at 37–39). 
 28. Cross, supra note 20, at 866 (“I propose the following simple test for 
distinguishing between positive and negative rights—if there was no 
government in existence, would the right be automatically fulfilled?”). 
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be drawn, the right to vote is on the positive side of the line. Not only 
would there be no way to vote in the absence of government, there 
would also be no point. 
The existence of an unambiguously positive right at the center of 
our scheme of federal constitutional rights raises a number of significant 
issues. For one thing, because the right to vote is linked with other rights 
in ways that courts cannot help but recognize, the positive character of 
the right to vote puts pressure on the Court’s unwillingness to read the 
federal Constitution as a charter of positive rights in other spheres. In 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez,29 the Court had to struggle mightily to prevent 
the right to vote from becoming a basis for a positive right to 
education.30 The Court first blocked the connection by holding that a 
right to vote did not entail any right to make “the most informed 
electoral choice.”31 But logically, the Court had to concede that if some 
education was required to enable citizens to “participat[e] in the political 
process” at all, that minimal level or “identifiable quantum” of 
education would indeed be constitutionally guaranteed as a positive 
right.32 The Court avoided this problem by asserting that there was “no 
indication” Texas fell below such a minimum.33 Had the suit in 
Rodriguez been framed in terms of educational adequacy rather than 
equity, as Frank Michelman argued that positive social rights claims are 
best framed,34 the implications for education of a positive right to vote 
would not have been so easily avoided. And indeed, state courts have 
used the connection between voting and education to decide how much 
state action is required to fulfill state constitutional rights to education.35 
The positive character of the right to vote raises profound questions 
about the law of election administration itself. These are questions of a 
somewhat uncomfortable kind in the American constitutional 
tradition—questions about how much and what kinds of state action 
this positive right entails. Does the right to vote require assistance from 
 
 29. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 30. See id. at 35–37. 
 31. Id. at 36. 
 32. Id. at 36–37 
 33. Id. at 37 (“[N]o charge fairly could be made that the system fails to 
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills 
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in 
the political process.”). 
 34. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969). 
 35. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 
(1995) (“[A] sound basic education . . . should consist of the basic literacy, 
calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function 
productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a jury.”). 
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poll workers of the kind that was at issue in the Murkowski litigation—a 
list of names and how to spell them on request?36  What about help with 
operating the machine itself? As Flanders notes, one constraint on 
assistance of this kind is the need to avoid allowing poll workers, in the 
guise of assisting voters, to persuade, or worse, to coerce.37 
In a similar vein, we might ask whether and to what extent 
accommodations for voters with disabilities, or ballots for voters who 
cannot read English, are constitutionally required. Both of these are 
forms of assistance required by statute. These statutes do 
constitutionally significant work by enabling voters who might 
otherwise be marginalized to cast ballots as equals of their fellow 
citizens. But these statutes apply only in certain circumstances. In the 
case of language assistance, the circumstances turn on the size of the 
group: the Voting Rights Act’s language assistance provisions apply 
only to groups that are numerically large.38 In contrast, federal and state 
laws establish criteria for accommodating voters with disabilities that do 
not vary with the number of voters with disabilities in a given 
jurisdiction.39 
It requires some work to understand why the scope of a positive 
individual right would change with the size of a group, let alone why it 
would do so for language and not for disability.  The best answer seems 
to be that while the individual right does not change, any analysis of 
what the state must do to vindicate that right must take costs into 
 
 36. See Flanders, supra note 1, at 5–7. 
 37. Id. at 10. 
 38. See Voting Rights Act § 203, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a (2006) (triggering 
language assistance provisions when a single language minority accounts for 
more than 10,000 voting-age citizens, more than 5% of the citizen voting-age 
population in a jurisdiction, or more than 5% of the American Indian or Native 
Alaskan population on a reservation, and in addition, the illiteracy rate of 
citizens in this language minority is higher than the national illiteracy rate). 
Similarly, some state laws that go beyond federal law and that dispense with the 
illiteracy criterion also rely on numerical thresholds. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 
2103 (West 2003) (requiring counties to provide certain forms of assistance, such 
as “mak[ing] reasonable efforts to recruit deputy registrars who are fluent” in 
that language, when a group of non-English speaking citizens “approximate 3 
percent or more of the voting age residents of a precinct.”). 
 39. The relevant federal statutes include provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C § 1973aa-6 (2006), the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and 
Handicapped Act (VAEHA), id. §§ 1973ee to 1973ee-6, Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, id. § 12132, and the Help America Vote Act, id. §§ 15301 to 
15306.  See also GAO, VOTERS WITH DISABILITIES: ACCESS TO POLLING PLACES AND 
ALTERNATIVE VOTING METHODS 5 (2001) (“All states have provisions (in the form 
of statutes, regulations, or policies) that specifically address voting by people 
with disabilities.”). No federal or state law of which I am aware turns on the 
number or proportion of voters with disabilities in a particular jurisdiction. 
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account. At some point, a judge, legislature, or administrative agency 
must make a determination that this much, and no more, is required of 
the state, even though more might help some particular voter cast a 
ballot. Requiring uniform disability accommodations, but only printing 
ballots for the largest language minorities, is a compromise that reflects 
these countervailing cost considerations. It is also a compromise that 
may reflect some shadow conception of group rights and political 
power. Voting has a group dimension, in addition to its individual and 
structural elements, and groups the size of large language minorities 
have the ability to sway election outcomes in a way that other groups do 
not. Thus, part of the difference between language and disability may be 
that the law views language minority groups as making out group 
claims for representation that augment the individual accommodation 
claims of their members—or at least give the state a reason for choosing 
those claims, if it would be too costly to accommodate all claims.40 
Once we start down the road of acknowledging that voting is a 
positive right that the state will have to spend money to vindicate, it is 
tempting to throw up our hands. How are courts or legislators to 
determine what this right entails? The temptation is to fall back on a 
model of equity rather than minimum provision, to hold that it doesn’t 
matter what the state offers in the way of voting, as long as the rules are 
applied evenhandedly so that the voting process, however difficult or 
cumbersome, is open to all on equal terms. But this will not do. As 
Michelman argued a generation ago with regard to minimal social 
provision, minima are actually more justiciable than are equality claims 
when we are talking about positive rights.41 The project of deciding 
whether an election is open to all on equal terms is impossible: because 
some of us have disabilities, others do not speak English, and all of us 
live in different locations, work different hours, and so forth, many 
perfectly neutral and uniformly applied rules that vindicate my right to 
vote may thwart yours. Instead, the best way is the one that seems the 
most foreign, but actually is not: Just as federal courts decide how much 
and what kind of criminal representation meets a threshold of adequacy, 
and just as state courts determine what forms of education their 
constitution requires, legislatures and courts must decide how much 
and what kinds of assistance the positive right to vote requires, taking 
into account the different circumstances voters face. The answers will 
 
 40. Numerous states and localities have passed laws specifically requiring 
that ballots or other materials be made available in particular languages.  See 
Angelo N. Ancheta, Language Assistance and Local Voting Rights Law, 44 IND. L. 
REV. 161 (2010). These laws reflect political compromises among groups. 
 41. Michelman, supra note 34, at 9–11. 
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evolve over time, as our experience of the election process evolves. The 
Alaska Supreme Court has advanced the ball a small but perceptible 
amount by judging that, yes, the right to vote does include being 
informed of how to spell M-U-R-K-O-W-S-K-I. 
 
